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Divided Attention and Processes
Underlying Sense of Agency
Wen Wen*, Atsushi Yamashita and Hajime Asama
Department of Precision Engineering, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Sense of agency refers to the subjective feeling of controlling events through one’s
behavior or will. Sense of agency results from matching predictions of one’s own actions
with actual feedback regarding the action. Furthermore, when an action involves a cued
goal, performance-based inference contributes to sense of agency. That is, if people
achieve their goal, they would believe themselves to be in control. Previous studies have
shown that both action-effect comparison and performance-based inference contribute
to sense of agency; however, the dominance of one process over the other may shift
based on task conditions such as the presence or absence of specific goals. In this
study, we examined the influence of divided attention on these two processes underlying
sense of agency in two conditions. In the experimental task, participants continuously
controlled a moving dot for 10 s while maintaining a string of three or seven digits in
working memory. We found that when there was no cued goal (no-cued-goal condition),
sense of agency was impaired by high cognitive load. Contrastingly, when participants
controlled the dot based on a cued goal (cued-goal-directed condition), their sense
of agency was lower than in the no-cued-goal condition and was not affected by
cognitive load. The results suggest that the action-effect comparison process underlying
sense of agency requires attention. On the other hand, the weaker influence of divided
attention in the cued-goal-directed condition could be attributed to the dominance of
performance-based inference, which is probably automatic.
Keywords: attention, cognitive load, comparator model, dual task, performance, sense of agency, working
memory
INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous experience of a subjective feeling of control over the outcome of events through
one’s behavior refers to sense of agency. When one uses external tools, such as a keyboard to type
a text message, a sense of agency in producing letters on the screen may have resulted because
changes on the screen precisely match the individual’s predictions (Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore
et al., 2002). Such matching processes linked to sense of agency can be explained through the
comparator model, according to which, a predicted state is generated from an eﬀerence copy of
one’s motor command and is compared with actual sensory information; a match results in sense
of agency while a mismatch diminishes sense of agency (Blakemore et al., 1998, 1999; Frith et al.,
2000; Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). In the present study, this comparison process is termed the
action-eﬀect comparison. For example, sense of agency increases considerably when there is amatch
between actual sensory feedback and predictions based on prior experience (Sato and Yasuda,
2005). Further, the comparator model was also able to show that the abnormal sense of agency
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experienced by schizophrenic patients is linked to diﬃculty with
generating predictions (Cahill et al., 1996; Frith et al., 2000).
In addition to the feed-forward processes emphasized in
comparator models, recent studies have highlighted the role of
reconstructive processes (Wegner, 2003; Wegner et al., 2004;
Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Synofzik et al., 2008; Wen et al.,
2015c). Wegner’s reconstructive account of the sense of agency
suggests that when a thought appears in consciousness before
an action is executed (the priority principle), is consistent
with the action (the consistency principle), and there are no
alternative causes of the action (the exclusivity principle), the
individual believes that he/she is the agent of that action (Wegner,
2003). Although Wegner’s theory was intended to provide a
reconstructive account of conscious will or action (i.e., conscious
will is a result of the principles outlined by Wegner), it also
inﬂuences the theory on sense of agency for external events.
That is, sense of agency is not only generated from predictive
processes—predicting that an eﬀect will occur—but also from
reconstructive processes, such as making inferences after an
eﬀect occurs. Recent studies have reported that reconstructive
processes signiﬁcantly inﬂuence sense of agency (Wegner et al.,
2004; Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2013; Wen
et al., 2015c). For example, inference based on performance
is a reconstructive process, and a previous study found that
individuals felt a stronger sense of agency when they performed
well even when their actual control was weakened (Wen et al.,
2015c).
Thus, both action-eﬀect comparison processes and
performance-based inference are considered to contribute
to the sense of agency, and the strength of these underlying
processes may diﬀer in diﬀerent conditions (Moore and Fletcher,
2012; Synofzik et al., 2013; Wen et al., 2015c). Nonetheless, it is
still unclear whether these processes are automatic or controlled
by attentional demand. Attention is the process of focusing
one’s consciousness on speciﬁc stimuli or processes; however,
attentional resources are considered to be limited (Baddeley,
2003). If people have to perform two or more attention-
demanding tasks simultaneously, their attention is divided
between tasks, potentially resulting in inhibitory eﬀects in all
tasks. Research suggests that there are two types of processes
based on attentional demand (Schneider and Shiﬀrin, 1977;
Schneider and Chein, 2003); controlled processes are temporary
sequences of memory nodes activated under the control of
attention, while automatic processes involve the automatic
activation of a sequence of memory nodes without attentional
control (Schneider and Shiﬀrin, 1977). Typically, automatic
processes are fast, parallel, robust, and less controllable, with low
attentional demands, while controlled processes are slow, serial,
eﬀortful, and brittle (Schneider and Chein, 2003). Neuroscience
research has provided evidence for a dissociation between
controlled and automatic processes (Hahne and Friederici, 1999;
Schneider and Chein, 2003). In addition, if a task involves both
controlled and automatic processes, insuﬃcient attentional
resources may result in changes in the dominance of underlying
processes; typically, controlled processes would be impaired
while automatic processes would dominate (e.g., Gardiner and
Parkin, 1990; Yonelinas, 2002; Evans, 2008).
Previous studies on the development of sense of agency
suggest that both implicit and explicit cues can inﬂuence the
judgment of agency (Aarts et al., 2005; Linser and Goschke, 2007;
Wenke et al., 2010). Explicit cues refer to stimuli that can be
consciously perceived, while implicit cues refer to stimuli that
cannot be consciously perceived (e.g., visual stimuli presented
for 10–20 ms). A two-step theory of agency distinguishes
between judgments and feelings of agency, suggesting that the
former is an explicit, conceptual, interpretative judgment of
being the agent, whereas the latter is non-conceptual, low-level,
and implicit understanding (Synofzik et al., 2008). However,
it is unclear whether the judgment or feeling of agency is
controlled or automatic processes. Processes that are inﬂuenced
by implicit cues may also require attentional resources, because
implicit cues may inﬂuence the perception of action eﬀects
(e.g., they may be easier to perceive or are perceived more
vividly; Bar and Biederman, 1998; Stenner et al., 2014), and
therefore aﬀect sense of agency. However, the comparison of
action and eﬀect itself may require attention. On the other
hand, processes that use explicit cues—such as performance
or contextual cues—could be performed automatically without
cognitive resources (i.e., do not rely on attentional resources;
De Neys, 2006). In addition, the theory posits that implicit
and explicit processes do not correspond to automatic and
controlled processes, because the latter classiﬁcation is based on
attention, not consciousness. For example, although controlled
processes are consciously performed, conscious processes may be
controlled or automatic.
Further, a prior study has reported that sense of agency
decreased with higher cognitive load when the action and eﬀect
were consistent and the temporal interval between them was no
longer than 100ms (Hon et al., 2013). However, in Haggard et al.’s
(2002) study on the intentional binding eﬀect—which refers to
the temporal compression of the interval between one’s voluntary
action and the corresponding eﬀect, considered to reﬂect implicit
aspects of sense of agency—binding eﬀects were stronger when
participants were unable to focus their attention on a speciﬁc
event (Haggard and Cole, 2007), indicating that divided attention
might promote implicit sense of agency. To the best of our
knowledge, no study has investigated the attentional demands of
both perceptual and higher-order cognitive processes underlying
sense of agency.
In the present study, we attempted to examine the inﬂuence of
divided attention on both the action-eﬀect comparison process
and performance-based inference that underlie sense of agency,
in order to determine whether these processes are controlled
or automatic. We employed a dual-task paradigm to ensure
participants’ divided attention for the agency task. Participants
continuously controlled a target on a computer screen for a
speciﬁc duration, and then rated their sense of agency on the
target’s location while doing a memory task that simultaneously
required continuous attention. The dual-task paradigm has been
widely used to examine whether or not a process has attentional
demands (Baddeley et al., 1984; Fernandes andMoscovitch, 2000,
2002; Schneider and Chein, 2003; Pouliot and Gagnon, 2005).
Moreover, participants controlled the target with or without a
cued goal in two conditions. In the no-cued-goal condition,
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participants controlled a target and moved it on the screen
according to their own will. Because a speciﬁc goal was not
present in the no-cued-goal condition, performance feedback was
not provided to participants. Although actions may be driven
by internal goals, active performance-based inference would be
much lower in this condition than when a cued-goal and feedback
of attainment of the goal were present wherein the judgment
of agency would primarily rely on how similar the change
in the direction of the target’s movement was to participants’
predictions of the movement of the dot. Contrastingly, in the
cued-goal-directed condition, participants were instructed to
move the target to a speciﬁc destination as much as possible.
Since feedback of goal attainment was provided to participants,
performance-based inference would play an important role in
the judgment of agency (Wen et al., 2015b,c). If the action-
eﬀect comparison process involves attentional control, sense
of agency would be impaired by high cognitive load, and the
decrease in sense of agency in the no-cued-goal condition
would be larger. If the comparison process is automatic, but
inference requires attention, sense of agency in the cued-
goal-directed condition would be more strongly inﬂuenced by
divided attention than in the no-cued-goal condition, because
performance-based inference is more likely to have a greater
inﬂuence on sense of agency in the cued-goal-directed condition
than in the no-cued-goal condition. If both comparison and
inference processes require attention, sense of agency in no-cued-
goal and cued-goal-directed conditions would be impaired by
high cognitive load. However, in this case, a separate condition
with no visible target and only feedback on goal achievement is
needed to further examine whether performance-based inference
is automatic or controlled. Moreover, the interval between actions
and eﬀects was used to vary the diﬃculty of the experimental
task, as delays would not only increase the task diﬃculty (i.e.,
directing the moving dot into the destination), but would also
make comparisons between actions and their corresponding
eﬀects more diﬃcult.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 18 students with normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity participated in the experiment and received monetary
compensation for participation. Participants’ mean age was
25.7 years (SD = 3.6, range: 22–33). All participants were
right-handed. The experiment was approved by the ethics
committee of the Faculty of Engineering at the University of
Tokyo and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Task and Procedure
In each trial of the experimental task (Figure 1), participants were
ﬁrst shown a black cross at the center of a 597 mm × 336 mm
(width × height) screen with a gray background for 500 ms.
Then, a string of three (low-load condition) or seven (high-load
condition) randomly generated digits replaced the cross and was
presented for 3 s. Participants were required to maintain the
digit string in their mind during the trial. After the digit string
disappeared, a 5-mm black dot appeared at a random position
on the screen for 10 s and moved at a speed of 124 mm/s. The
original direction of the dot was randomly generated and diﬀered
between trials. The direction of the dot did not change until
participants pressed the left or right key during the trial. The dot
bounced back when it reached the screen borders. Participants
were instructed to repeatedly press the left or right key on a
keyboard with their index and middle ﬁngers of their right hand
to change the direction of the moving dot. The direction of
the dot turned 20◦ clockwise with a right key press and 20◦
counterclockwise with a left key press.
In the no-cued-goal condition, only a moving dot appeared on
the screen. Participants were asked to pressing the left and right
keys continuously, according to their will in order to determine
whether the direction of the moving dot responded to their key
presses. They were requested to avoid pressing only one key. They
were instructed that they could move the dot to any position of
their choosing on the screen. In the cued-goal-directed condition,
a 30-mm empty square with a black border appeared at the
center of the screen together with the moving dot. Participants
were instructed to determine their control over the moving dot.
Furthermore, they were instructed to direct the dot into the
square as quickly as possible. When the dot had crossed the
border to enter the square, the color of the dot turned red to
indicate its arrival, and the dot continued moving. After leaving
the square, the color of the dot turned black. Participants were
instructed to direct the dot back into the square (if the dot went
out) as often as possible within the given time (10 s). After the
task, participants rated the extent to which they felt that the dot
was under their control on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all; 9 = a
lot) by clicking on-screen radio buttons using a mouse; they then
had to input the digit string that was presented at the beginning
of the trial using the keyboard. There were three possible delays
(100, 400, and 700 ms) between participants’ key presses and the
dot’s response. The delay was consistent within each trial and
varied randomly between trials. Participants were told that both
the memory test and the dot-controlling task were important and
that they should divide their attention equally between the two
tasks. Participants were not given feedback on their accuracy in
the memory task.
Ratings on agency, number of arrivals at the destination (in
the cued-goal-directed condition), and responses in the memory
task were recorded for each trial. The number of arrivals at the
destination reﬂects participants’ task performance in the cued-
goal-directed condition. Accuracy of responses in the memory
task reﬂects the engaged cognitive resources.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room; they
were seated on a chair positioned about 50 cm from a 27-in
LCD monitor with a resolution of 1,920 pixels × 1,080 pixels.
After receiving instructions, participants were administered
10 practice trials with random delays and conditions. Each
participant then completed 120 experimental trials, comprising
10 trials for each delay condition (100, 400, and 700 ms),
each load condition (low- and high-load condition), and each
goal condition (no-cued-goal and cued-goal-directed condition),
presented in a random order. The 120 trials were divided into
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FIGURE 1 | Timeline of an experimental task trial in the cued-goal-directed condition. Participants were instructed to maintain a 3- or 7-digit string in their
mind while directing the moving dot into the square as quickly as possible by pressing the left and right keys to change the direction in which the dot traveled. Ten
seconds after the appearance of the dot, participants used a mouse to rate the extent to which they felt that the dot was under their control, and then inputted the
memorized digital string with the keyboard. In the no-cued-goal condition, the square was not presented, and participants were instructed to control the dot
according to their will.
two blocks, each containing 60 trials. Participants took 5-min
breaks between blocks. On average, the experiment lasted for
60 min.
RESULTS
Agency Rating
A 2 (no-cued-goal or cued-goal-directed condition) × 2 (low- or
high-load condition) × 3 (100, 400, or 700 ms delay) repeated-
measures ANOVA on the agency rating scores was conducted
to examine the overall experimental design. The main eﬀect of
goal was signiﬁcant [F(1,17) = 11.05, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.39];
participants gave lower agency ratings in the cued-goal-directed
condition compared to in the no-cued-goal condition (cued-goal-
directed:M = 5.38; no-cued-goal:M = 5.68). The main eﬀects of
cognitive load and delay were also signiﬁcant [F(1,17) = 11.46,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.40; F(2,34) = 85.75, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.84,
respectively]. Participants gave lower agency ratings in the high
cognitive load condition compared to the low cognitive load
condition (high load: M = 5.43; low load: M = 5.63). Post
hoc comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) on delay showed that
participants provided lower agency ratings in the longer delay
conditions compared to shorter delays (100-ms delay:M = 6.91;
400-ms delay: M = 5.72; 700-ms delay: M = 3.97; for all
diﬀerences between delay conditions, ps = 0.000). Furthermore,
the only signiﬁcant interaction was between goal and cognitive
load [F(1,17) = 9.07, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.35, Figure 2A]. In
order to clarify this interaction and the inﬂuence of cognitive
load in trials with and without a goal, we re-examined our
results for the no-cued-goal and cued-goal-directed conditions
separately.
In the no-cued-goal condition, the main eﬀects of load and
delay were both signiﬁcant [F(1,17)= 49.29, p= 0.000, η2p = 0.74;
F(2,34) = 59.46, p = 0.000, η2p = 0.78, respectively; Figure 2B],
while the interaction between load and delay was not signiﬁcant
[F(2,34) = 1.11, p = 0.088, η2p = 0.06]. Participants gave lower
ratings in the high cognitive load condition compared to the
low cognitive load condition (high load: M = 5.49; low load:
M = 5.87). Post hoc comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) for
delay showed that participants felt that they had less control in
the longer delay conditions relative to shorter delay conditions
(100-ms delay: M = 6.98; 400-ms delay: M = 5.85; 700-ms
delay: M = 4.22; diﬀerences between all delay conditions were
signiﬁcant, ps = 0.000).
In contrast, in the cued-goal-directed condition, only the
main eﬀect of delay was signiﬁcant [F(2,34) = 86.26, p = 0.000,
η2p = 0.84; Figure 2C). Post hoc comparisons (Bonferroni-
corrected) for delay showed that participants felt that they had
less control in the longer delay conditions relative to shorter
delay conditions (for the 100-ms delay condition, M = 6.85;
for the 400-ms delay condition, M = 5.58; for the 700-ms
condition, M = 3.72; diﬀerences between all delay conditions
were signiﬁcant, ps = 0.000). The availability of cognitive
resources had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on agency ratings and did not
interact with delay [main eﬀect of load: F(1,17)= 0.07, p= 0.794,
η2p = 0.00; interaction between load and delay: F(2,34) = 1.62,
p= 0.213, η2p = 0.09]. Therefore, when goals were present during
the dot-controlling task, higher cognitive load did not aﬀect
agency ratings.
Performance of Main and Secondary
Tasks
The proportion of correct answers for the digit memory task
and the average number of arrivals in each trial in the cued-
goal-directed condition are shown in Figures 3 and 4, as
indices of performance in the memory task (i.e., secondary
task) and experimental (i.e., main task), respectively. Regarding
memory of digit strings, the main eﬀect of load was signiﬁcant
[F(1,17) = 13.76, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.45], but the main eﬀects of
goal and delay, and the interactions between all three factors were
not signiﬁcant [main eﬀect of goal: F(1,17) = 0.00, p = 1.000,
η2p = 0.05; main eﬀect of delay: F(2,34) = 0.448, p = 0.643,
η2p = 0.03; interaction between goal and load: F(1, 17) = 0.02,
p = .892, ηp2 = 0.00; interaction between goal and delay:
F(2,34) = 0.27, p = 0.765, η2p = 0.02; interaction between load
and delay: F(2,34) = 2.71, p = 0.081, η2p = 0.14; interaction
between goal, load, and delay: F(2,34) = 0.36, p = 0.703,
η2p = 0.02]. Participants’ accuracy in the memory task was
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FIGURE 2 | Mean agency ratings in each condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. (A) Shows mean agency ratings in the no-cued-goal and
cued-goal-directed conditions; (B) shows mean agency ratings in the no-cued-goal condition by delay and cognitive load; (C) shows mean agency ratings in the
cued-goal-directed condition by delay and cognitive load; agency ratings were impaired by high cognitive load in the no-cued-goal condition, but were not
influenced by cognitive load in the cued-goal-directed condition.
FIGURE 3 | Proportion of correct responses in the digit memory task.
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Performance in the memory
task was poorer in the high cognitive load condition than that in the low
cognitive load condition.
better in the low-load condition than in the high-load condition
(low-load condition: proportion of correct answer = 97%; high-
load condition: proportion of correct answer = 84%). It was
more diﬃcult to memorize seven digits while controlling the
moving dot than to memorize three digits; the former may have
required more cognitive resources. Regarding performance of
the experimental task, the main eﬀect of delay was signiﬁcant
[F(2,34)= 79.81, p= 0.000, η2p = 0.82], but the main eﬀect of load
[F(1,17) = 0.24, p = 0.629, η2p = 0.01] and the interactions were
not signiﬁcant [F(2,34) = 2.23, p = 0.123, η2p = 0.12]. Post hoc
comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) for delay showed that when
the delay in the dot’s response was longer, participants had greater
diﬃculty achieving the goal (M = 1.51, 1.09, and 0.52 in the
100, 400, and 700-ms delay conditions, respectively; diﬀerences
between all the conditions were signiﬁcant, ps = 0.000). It
is possible that cognitive load did not impair participants’
performance because the experimental task was not very diﬃcult.
Multivariate Analyses
In order to examine the role of divided attention on the
participant’s sense of agency over the moving dot and determine
the extent of its inﬂuence, we conducted multivariate analyses for
the two goal conditions. In the path model of the no-cued-goal
condition (Figure 5A), level of cognitive load (low load= 0, high
load = 1) and delay in response were included as independent
variables, while agency ratings were included as a dependent
variable. The dependent variable was directly inﬂuenced by
the two independent variables, respectively. For the cued-goal-
directed condition model (Figure 5B), the number of arrivals
was included as an index of experimental task performance in
addition to the three variables in the no-cued-goal condition
model. Sense of agency was inﬂuenced by the independent
(cognitive load and delay), and dependent variable (number of
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FIGURE 4 | The average number of arrivals at the destination per trial
in the experimental task. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Performance was impaired by delays in the dot’s response, but was not
influenced by cognitive load.
FIGURE 5 | Structural equation models and standardized regression
weights for the (A) no-cued-goal and (B) cued-goal-directed
conditions. The paths with significant regression weights (predictions differed
from zero at the 0.05 level, two-tailed) are represented by solid lines and the
non-significant paths are represented by broken lines.
arrivals). Multivariate analyses therefore allowed us to estimate
whether cognitive load and delay signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced sense of
agency directly or through other factors (e.g., task performance),
and compare the extent to which variables inﬂuenced each other
(e.g., the extent to which load and delay inﬂuenced sense of
agency) between diﬀerent goal conditions.
We performed structural equation modeling using IBM SPSS
Amos 22. The ﬁt parameters are shown in Table 1, and Figure 5
includes the standardized coeﬃcients for all paths (signiﬁcant
paths are represented by solid lines and non-signiﬁcant paths
are represented by broken lines). The two models demonstrate
very good ﬁt (Table 1). For the no-cued-goal condition model,
both cognitive load and delay signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced sense
of agency (p = 0.034 and p < 0.001, respectively), and
delay exerted a stronger inﬂuence. For the cued-goal-directed
condition model, delay signiﬁcantly and directly inﬂuenced sense
of agency (p < 0.001), but cognitive load did not (p = 0.979).
Furthermore, delay indirectly inﬂuenced sense of agency through
task performance (path from delay to performance: p < 0.001;
path from performance to sense of agency: p< 0.001).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined the inﬂuence of cognitive
load on sense of agency with and without a cued goal. In the
absence of a cued goal, actions were driven by internal goals; the
action-eﬀect comparison may have inﬂuenced the judgment of
agency; our results showed that divided attention impaired sense
of agency in this condition. In contrast, when actions were driven
by an externally cued goal, the cued goal and feedback on goal
attainment were salient cues for sense of agency; thus, processes
relying on these cues were unaﬀected by attentional resources.
When there was no cued goal, participants probably acted
upon internal goals. In this case, the judgment of agency
probably relied on comparisons between one’s actions and their
corresponding eﬀects. According to the comparator model,
comparisons rely on predictions based on eﬀerence copies of
motor signals. When cognitive load was high in the no-cued-
goal condition, both the predictions of eﬀects and comparisons
between prediction and actual sensory eﬀects would have been
more diﬃcult, resulting in a poorer sense of agency. However, it
is diﬃcult to determine which aspect of the comparison processes
was impaired by divided attention. Additionally, since we used
a self-report paradigm it is not possible to determine whether
cognitive load disrupted sense of agency itself, agency ratings,
or comparison processes. The impact of cognitive load should
be investigated further using diﬀerent measures of sense of
TABLE 1 | Fit parameters for the structural equation models for the
no-cued-goal and cued-goal-directed conditions.
Model χ2/df GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA
No-cued-goal 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Cued-goal-directed 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Good fit parameters <2.0 ≥0.90 ≥0.90 ≥0.90 ≥0.90 ≤0.08
GFI, Goodness of Fit Index; AGFI, Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index; NFI, Normed
Fit Index; CFI, Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA, Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation.
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agency. Additionally, in the cued-goal-directed condition, delay
did not interact with load. Thus, the insuﬃciency of attentional
resources appears to contribute to the diﬃculty in action-
eﬀect comparisons in a particular manner, rather than only
increasing the possibility of failure in matching. Hon et al.
(2013) have also found decrements in participants’ judgment
of agency for tasks with high cognitive load, however, this
phenomenon was not observed when the delay of the eﬀect
was longer than 100 ms. This may have occurred because
Hon et al. (2013) used a simpler measure for judging sense of
agency; participants compared a single action with an eﬀect,
receiving feedback only once. In the present experimental task,
participants had to control the moving dot continuously for a
speciﬁc duration, give multiple commands, and compare their
commands with continuous feedback. Therefore, the current
comparison task was more diﬃcult, as it required more cognitive
resources compared to Hon et al.’s (2013) study, allowing us to
detect the inﬂuence of divided attention. In addition, Haggard
and Cole (2007) found that the intentional binding eﬀect—
the compression of the temporal percept between actions and
eﬀects—is stronger when attention is divided between events
than that when attention is focus on one event. The intentional
binding eﬀect is considered to reﬂect implicit aspects of sense of
agency (Moore and Obhi, 2012). Therefore, based on Haggard
and Cole’s (2007) results, we can infer that divided attention
improves implicit aspects of sense of agency. However, the
link between the intentional binding eﬀect and sense of agency
remains controversial (Ebert and Wegner, 2010; Wen et al.,
2015a), and the inﬂuences of divided attention on sense of
agency and intentional binding eﬀect could result from diﬀerent
processes. Nonetheless, the link between sense of agency and
intentional binding and the properties of their underlying
processes involving attention need to be explored in greater
detail.
Further, we observed that when participants controlled the
dot with a cued goal and received feedback on goal attainment,
the availability of cognitive resources had no inﬂuence on the
judgment of agency. When actions were driven by an external
cued goal and feedback on goal attainment was provided,
the comparison between the cued-goal and feedback of goal
attainment probably was a salient cue for sense of agency, and
the underlying processes that used this cue probably did not
demand attention. That is, when feedback on goal attainment was
available, it served as a constant external cue for the judgment
of agency, while the internal cue—action-eﬀect comparison—
was impaired by cognitive load and had a weaker inﬂuence.
The multivariate analyses results (Figure 5) also showed that
the direct inﬂuence of delay on sense of agency in the cued-
goal-directed condition was weaker than in the no-cued-goal
condition (−0.58 vs. −0.77), and delay indirectly inﬂuenced the
sense of agency via task performance. Therefore, the diﬀering
inﬂuences of divided attention on sense of agency in the two
goal conditions may be attributable to the changing dominance
of underlying processes in the judgment of agency. In addition, a
limitation of the present study is that although the action-eﬀect
comparison had a weaker inﬂuence on the judgment of agency
in the cued-goal-directed condition compared to the no-cued-
goal condition, the action-eﬀect comparison in the judgment
of agency was not completely controlled in the cued-goal-
directed condition. Therefore, in order to conclusively state that
performance-based inference is automatic, a condition without a
visible moving target and where only feedback on performance is
provided should be included in future studies.
Alternatively, the presence of a goal may have increased
attention to the experimental task (dot-controlling task),
preventing the eﬀect of cognitive load. However, we believe that
this was not the case, because attentional capacity is considered to
be limited (Baddeley, 2003). If participants shifted their attention
from the digit memory task to the experimental task in the cued-
goal-directed condition, their performance in the digit memory
task should have decreased. However, performance in the digit
task did not diﬀer between the performance-based and no-
cued-goal conditions (Figure 3), suggesting that the participants
divided their attention in the same manner in the diﬀerent goal
conditions, as instructed by the experimenter.
In addition, we found that participants felt that they had less
control when the goal was cued compared to when the goal
was absent. This suggests that developing a sense of agency
based on performance-based inferences compared to action-
eﬀect comparisons may be more diﬃcult, although the former
requires fewer cognitive resources. These results were consistent
with a recent study that examined the inﬂuence of the goal on
sense of control (Wen et al., 2015b). When a goal is present, sense
of control is inﬂuenced by the comparison of the expectation
of goal achievement and actual performance; consequently, the
existence of a goal impairs sense of control when feedback is
inconsistent with one’s expectations (Wen et al., 2015b). The
inﬂuence of performance-based inference should be examined
further by excluding action-eﬀect comparison in the judgment
of agency.
In summary, using a dual-task continuous control paradigm,
we found that action-eﬀect comparison underlying sense of
agency is a controlled process, while the performance-based
inference is an automatic process. The present study provides
important insights that clarify the mechanism of sense of agency.
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